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Davies: Reaganomics and the Supply-Side: A Rationale

reaganomics and the supply side
A rationale
J kenneth davies
not intended as a defense of the reagan economic
program as such nor even of the reagan political posturing and rhetoric these are in a constant state of flux made necessary by changing
political and economic forces as well as the bargaining game being
played between the president congress public pressure groups and
factions within the administration itself
it is intended to present some economic facts and to identify a set
of economic principles which just might help extricate the nation
from the multifaceted economic dilemma it now faces 1 this set of
principles is often referred to in the popular literature as reagan
comics but this term is far too narrow and is frequently used by
omics
liberals pejoratively indicating the concepts originated with president reagan also referred to as supply side economics these principles are historically valid enough to stand on their own while they
have by and large been espoused by president reagan and a number
of his advisors they are by no means the product of or limited to that
group they are principles being given consideration by a small but
growing number of economists searching for a viable alternative to
the liberal keynesian policies which have been in force worldwide and
which in the opinion of some have helped lead the US and much of
the world into the present economic problems and it is obvious that
such policies have been unable to respond effectively the principles
of reaganomics or supply side economics are philosophically related
to but not synonymous with classical economics
to understand and evaluate this set of principles the reader
must first recognize the economic milieu facing america as 1980
passed into 1981
1981 most of these points represent long run trends

this paper

is

J kenneth davies is chairman of the department of managerial economics brigham young university
the essence of this article was developed in the late spring of 1982 by the late fall the economic data
indicated substantial improvement however the long run problems still remain we may have turned the
corner but the road ahead is still long
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industrial production was falling having decreased
from an index of 152 in 1979 to 147 in 1980
unemployment had risen from 58
5.8
58 in 1979 to
7.1
71 in 1980 an increase of 22
prime interest rates had almost doubled during the
previous year having reached a peak of 215
21.5
215
the rate of inflation had risen from a consumer
in 1976 to a peak of 13.3
155
153
price index of 5
in
133
1979

productivity output per hour was down having
fallen about one percentage point since reaching a
high in 1977 as compared with a 7 increase between 1974 and 1977
corporate profits had fallen from an index of 197 to
6
182 in one year
7
skyrocketing
the national debt was continuing its sky
rocketing
growth increasing by 83 billion in 1980 and that
during a period of international peace
8
the social security system was almost bankrupt
bankruptcies were proceeding at a forty year high
9
10
the economy was so enervated that the value of the
american dollar in the international trade had been
falling for years
there was not one major positive aggregate economic statistic in
1980 81 there was no better formula for economic disaster
5

A

historical perspective

it must be remembered that this condition had been generating
over a period of many years in which keynesian economics and social
liberalism had dominated economic thought and american public
policy in all fairness the importance of what was happening was
really unknown to most economic observers and policy makers until
the 1970s most economists had been swept into the keynesian tide
and it was not until that decade that they first became aware of the
coexistence of both excessive inflation and high unemployment
which has come to be called stagflation
during the 1930s there was excessive unemployment but no inflation in the 1940s the nation experienced war induced inflation
but little unemployment while there were several recessions during
Elsen
the eisenhower
eisen hower years prices and interest rates were relatively stable
426
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the

tragically abbreviated kennedy years were also reasonably comfortable the economy making progress against unemployment with
relatively stable prices
it is perhaps understandable that both
academic economists and policy makers perceived inflation and recession as mutually exclusive that there could be one or the other but
not both together public policy could then be devised which simply
either reduced unemployment or inflation this was public policy
compatible with keynesian oriented economic analysis the politics
of keynesian oriented policy was however another story policy
directed toward recession was politically popular that against infla-

tion was unpopular
ejohnson war years 1963 68 that a major ecoth johnson
it was during the
nomic blunder was made which set in motion forces which brought
stagflation it was assumed that the nation could have both guns
after all we were the richest most powerful nation in
and butter
the world and it was generally thought that we could continue to
support both a war and a high level of consumption the nation engaged in an expensive and protracted war in southeast asia without
making the necessary domestic consumer sacrifices little attempt
was made to restrain prices and wages
in addition the newly
launched war on poverty was continued through a period of
escalating prices the result was inflation worsened by the supply
shocks of worldwide shortages of food fiber and oil as the nation
moved into the seventies the inflation became so entrenched that
the public came to expect that inflation would continue and people
developed all sorts of devices to protect themselves against its effects
these devices in turn acted to insure wage price escalation with inflation feeding upon itself A people expecting inflation and acting
accordingly produces what has been referred to as inflationary expectations
sian demand management was politically unable to
slan
keynesian
tat ions Keyne
or reduced
correct that problem the required increased taxes and
andor
government spending were both political anathema
the 1970s became a decade characterized by both rapidly rising
prices and rapidly increasing unemployment the public policy dilemma was that when action was taken to restrain inflation unemployment increased when steps were taken to reduce unemployment inflation resulted the only way out of this dilemma seemed
to be the imposition of price and wage controls while the government
and the federal reserve stimulated the aggregate demand in hopes of
reducing unemployment through fiscal decreased taxes and increased spending and monetary increased money supply policy
the american people were not prepared to accept for long such a
427
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radical solution the controls reluctantly imposed by nixon ended
without ceremony but with to be expected rapid escalation of prices
keynesian
sian
slan
by 1980 it became apparent that the practices of Keyne
economics and social liberalism were unable to contain or control
the aggregate economy while many of the goals were laudable
prosperity stability and justice after fifty years of operation leaders had not been ableto
abie
able to achieve them in concert it became increasablerto
ingly apparent to many that full employment stable prices a high
rate of economic growth and economic freedom were mutually incompatible although they were desirable the attempt to engineer
them had failed producing the economic instability of the 1970s
THREE AGGREGATE ECONOMIC MODELS

this failure resulted in large measure from some false economic
assumptions and the resultant invalid conclusions these errors can
be illustrated by contrasting three highly simplified models representing pre keynesian keynesian and post keynesian aggregate economics 2
pre keynesian model
the classical model dominating economic thought until the
1930s assumed a long run aggregate supply AS curve or function in
1950s

the

price
levei
level
pa
p2

pa
p1

pa
p3

FE

figure

1

pre keynesian classical model

2the
athe author recognizes the limitations of these simplified models but views their expository advantages
outweighing their limitations

as
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which production employment and income PEI would be at the
full employment FE level maintained there by perfectly flexible
prices and wages this is illustrated in figure 1 if the economy produced too little relative to demand prices and wages would automatically increase stimulating production if too much were produced
prices would quickly fall reducing production the induced aggregate demand AD 3 regardless of its level would be sufficient to
maintain full employment whether at adi
AD
ada or ad3
ada unemadl ad2
ployment would not exist for long there was no need for government intervention economic ills would cure themselves

the keynesian model

in the 1930s john maynard keynes and liberal philosophers recognized the errors of assumptions and conclusions in classical economics while prices and wages could increase they were not flexible
downward aggregate demand did not always respond quickly to
changes in aggregate supply high unemployment could exist for excessively
ces sively long periods of time it appeared that economic ills would
not necessarily cure themselves the decade long depression of the
1930s
1950s seemed to be proof of this their new model is illustrated in
figure 2 they assumed an aggregate supply in which any level of

price
level

pa
p2

AD

pa
p1

AD

AD

pel
PEI
peil
pell
figure
says law

pel
PEI

FE

2

keynesian model

whatever was produced
would automatically give rise to the demand for that production according to say surpluses leading to
recession were in the long run impossible see william J baumol and alan S blinder economics new
york harcourt
Har coun brace jovanovich 1982 p 778
was assumed namely that supply would create its own demand
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production would be achieved up to the full employment level FE
by stimulating aggregate demand adl
AD
without any inflaad2without
adi to ad2
ada
tion any stimulation of AD beyond that point to ad3would
ADs would be
top2
inflationary prices rising topa
to 2 they also assumed that aggregate demand on its own was usually insufficient to achieve full employment
that operating on its own devices
id b e to the left of the full
ould
devices ii t w ou
employment level implicit in their model was the assumption that
demand creates its own supply create the demand necessary to
achieve full employment and the needed supply would be forthcoming this is just the opposite of the classical model
government was the only effective means of stimulating aggregate demand to the full employment level it could be reached
through fiscal andor monetary policy which would compensate for
any deficiencies of the private sector the fiscal policy usually chosen
was to increase government spending meeting the modern day liberals agenda for increased government as the cure to socio economic
injustice reduced taxes could accomplish the same thing in aggregate terms by leaving more money for the private sector to spend
but this would mean decreased government an approach which is
contrary to the liberals prescription for socio economic planning to
them appropriate monetary policy was to increase the money supply
thus inducing low interest rates which would in turn encourage
spending implementing these policies would increase aggregate demand thereby stimulating production and employment theoretically full employment would be achieved without any inflationary
effect in the assumed unlikely event of inflation the appropriate
policy would be the reverse decrease aggregate demand back to the
full employment level by reduced government spending increased
taxes andor decreased money supply
the assumptions of the keynesian model were no more realistic
than were the pre keynesian ones though they appeared to be so until the administration of president johnson neared its close As long
as the economy experienced either recession or inflation but not both
at the same time the keynesian solutions seemed economically viable but the keynesian conclusions have not proven to be any more
valid for the 1970s and 1980s than the pre keynesian ones for the
1930s because neither represented reality A new model was clearly
needed
post keynesian model
it became apparent in the 1970s that there was a short run inverse relationship between prices and unemployment illustrated by

the
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p22 pa
the phillips curve figure 3 at alternatively lower prices pi pa
higher levels of unemployment ui
u2 ua would be experienced
ul ua
at alternatively lower levels of unemployment higher levels of inflation would exist the public policy implications of the phillips curve
trade off between inflation and
are that because of the short run tradeoff
unemployment the use of monetary or fiscal policy to correct either
one only exacerbates the other As action is taken to reduce inflation
unemployment increases as action is taken to reduce unemployment
inflation increases

price
levei
level

pa
p1
pa
p2
pa
p3

ua
u1

figure

3

ua
u2

ua
u3

phillips curve

short run movement

further complicating the issue was the apparent long run movement of the phillips curves up and to the right during the 1970s
worsening the trade
off at any given price level pi unemploytradeoff
ij2
u3 at any given level of unemployment
u2 ua
ment was worse ui ua
peb pc
as illustrated in figure 4
ua prices were higher Ppa pec
the mirror image of the phillips curve relates prices to production employment and income PEI illustrated by an aggregate supply curve which rises to the right as in figure 5 it may be seen that
e3
e2 ea
with a given aggregate supply the higher the level of PEI ei
el ea
p2 pa
p3 and all this at an escalating rate 4
the higher the prices pi pa
odthe
of the aggregate supply
the author recognizes that there may be challenges as to the slope ofthe

curve

he has

chosen to include in a given curve the extremes of the keynesian range the relatively flat portion and of the
classical range the relatively vermicle
verticle
verticle there are those who would eliminate either or both of the extremes
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price
levei
level

pi
1

pl

4

PC

pb
ab

PC

pl

P

unemployment

0

U

phillips curve

figure 4

price
levei
level

ua
u2

ua
u3

U

long run movement

pa
p3

pa
p2

pi

0

el
figure

5

aggregate supply

ea
e2

ea
e3

post keynesian model

ofpei
pel aggregate demand
PEI
at a very low level of
ofsei
could be stimulated say from AD
ada shown in figure 6 with
adi to ad2
adl
e2
substantial effect on production employment and income E
ei to ea
pa
but at higher levels of
but with little effect on prices pi to p2
if the economy

is
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production increases in production could be achieved only at the exp4
pense of larger and larger increases in prices pj to pa

price
levei pa
level
p4
pa
p3

pa
p2

pi

A
D
ad2
ada

aoi
adi
0

EI
el

figure

ea
e22

E
ea
ea
e3 E
e4

increasing aggregate demand

6

however should aggregate supply be diminished from AS
asi to
asl
p22 while
asa
as2 as seen in figure 7 prices would continue to rise pi to pa
PEI would be diminished E
ei to ei and consequently unemployment
would be increased

price
levei
level
pa
p2

ADI
adl
aoi

pel
PEI
el
figure

7

decreased aggregate supply
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on the other hand should aggregate supply increase from AS
asl to
asi
pel
ea
ofpei
PEI E
8higher levels of
e3 with reduced
asj
as3 as shown in figure 8 higher
asb
ei to e3with
ofsei
edwith
unemployment could be achieved and at lower prices pi to pj

price
levei
level

pi
pa
p3

0

el

figure

8

ea
e3

increased aggregate supply

LIBERAL SOCIAL PROGRAMS

keynesian economics relied almost solely on the stimulation of
aggregate demand to achieve high levels of production employment
and income and consequently lower levels of unemployment its
primary concern there was little concern for aggregate supply or inin
fla tion beginning in the 1930s the liberal establishment began to
flation
put into place a number of programs with the most desirable and
democratic of individual and immediate goals and objectives they
would correct and eliminate the socio political economic injustices
of the existing american system they would create a new freedom
freedom from fear the poor would be lifted up the rich would be
brought down through subsidies to the former and graduated income taxes on the latter the nation s ills would be solved primarily
through the intervention of the federal government keynesian economists probably little realized the aggregate effect of these programs america was rich and powerful and knowledgeable enough to
conquer any foe including poverty
434
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illustrative of these programs is a far from complete list of
government programs each designed to correct a given ill
1
to correct the poverty often associated with industrial
accidents and disease we created OSHA occupational safety and health administration
2
to reduce the personal cost of unemployment we
established unemployment compensation
3
because of the economic distress associated with old
age we instigated the social security system
4
to create a floor under the standard of living we
passed minimum wages
5
to provide for social programs as well as pay for war
we developed highly progressive income taxes
6
in our war against poverty we developed a welfare
program with the basic philosophy that the poor are
entitled to relief payments untied to production we
even punished jurisdictions attempting to link them
7
to clean up our environment we created the environmental protection agency
8
to help the depressed farmers of the 1920s and 1930s
through increased agricultural prices we started a
system of limiting the production of food and fiber
each of these programs in and of itself had a laudable end product in mind and alone would have placed no great strain on the
economy however each one of them resulted in reduced production
of goods and services andor increased costs of production the
ultimate aggregate effect of all of these and many other institutional
changes beginning in the 1930s has been to restrain the aggregate
supply driving up prices higher and higher with little if any positive
effect on production and or employment in fact the cumulative effect appears to have reached the point of actually reducing aggregate
supply moving it to the left thereby driving up prices while actually
reducing total production employment and income PEI and consequently increasing unemployment this associated with continued
keynesian efforts to achieve full employment through the stimulation of aggregate demand along with continued supply shocks has
resulted in stagflation higher and higher prices stagnant or decreasing production with higher and higher levels of unemployment
adding to the inflation has been the very expectation of continued
inflation with inflation feeding on itself
435
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SUPPLY SIDE AGENDA

supply side economics 5 is basically an attempt to stimulate aggregate supply faster than aggregate demand increases 6 this could
be done to a considerable extent by restraining aggregate demand
while removing or reducing many of the artificial barriers to production created by much of the social legislation of the past forty years
the position of many supply siders is to change the mix of aggregate demand through the reduction of the government sector
thereby providing for the expansion of the private sector the position of this author is that the basic supply side goal reducing the rate
of inflation while stimulating production employment and income
can be accomplished without a significant reduction in the social
welfare programs it is probably this reduction and or elimination of
social welfare programs that raises the greatest resistance to supply
side economics
there is a way out which would require little change in basic
liberal goals and objectives economists by and large including conKeyne sians know that in the long run and in the agtemporary keynesians
gregate there aint no such thing as a free lunch
if people are going to eat the food must first be produced if those who are truly
incapable of taking care of themselves are to be helped every effort
must be made to increase the aggregate production of goods and services little milk can be taken from a sick cow and there can be little
care of the poor by a sick economy the economy is going to be no
healthier than its private sector americas cow if we want a lot of
good milk we must have a healthy cow if we want goods and services
enough for all we must have a healthy productive private economy 7
following is a list of objectives most of it in common with
supply side or reagan economics which just might help increase agtrade off between unemployment and
gregate supply reducing the tradeoff
inflation that is make possible lower rates of inflation concurrently
with higher levels of production employment and income and consequently lower unemployment rates
3supply side economics
supply

the gold standard

is often

daffer curves and a demand for a return to
cluttered up with nonessential datter
laffer
latter

the validity of these

not essential to this analysis
6the
athe usual view of supply siders is that if aggregate supply is permitted to grow aggregate demand will
the
expand to absorb it the view of this author is that public policy should not only consider the stimulation of
aggregate supply but should also restrain the artificial growth of aggregate demand this may be accomplished by restraining excessive increases in the rate of growth of the money supply
yme
yne
alle
aile malthusian spectre is often raised as a challenge to supply side economics it is assumed by some
dooms dayers that we have about reached the capacity of the world to increase aggregate supply the spectre
doomsdayers
has been periodically prof
erred since the early 1800s
preferred
is
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1

2

3

4

A limited and stable increase in the money supply in
this country increasing the money supply is basically
the function of the quasi independent federal reserve
system the federal reserve must set a limited range
within which it will allow the rate of growth of the
money supply to fluctuate this range must be in the
neighborhood of the capacity of the economy to grow
if the money supply grows faster it will induce inflation if slower it will retard growth resulting in increased unemployment such action will play a major
role in containing and stabilizing aggregate demand
and consequently controlling inflation it will make
unnecessary the periodic excessively harsh reactionary restrictive monetary policies which along with
huge federal deficits have created the high interest
rates of the past few years these in turn have
restricted private investment resulting in recession
A reduction of taxes on savers and investors if taxes
are reduced on savers and investors the incentive to
save and invest will increase and consumption and aggregate demand will be restrained the additional
savings will reduce interest rates the lower interest
rates will encourage an increase of investment making
possible an increased aggregate supply resulting in
greater production lower unemployment and increased productivity and making lower prices possible in addition the lower taxes will promote individual work effort
removal of unnecessary counterproductive regulatory
controls and subsidization of producers removing
counterproductive regulatory controls and subsidies
will increase work incentives increase output and
drive down costs of production directly and through
an increase in aggregate supply with positive effects
on both prices and unemployment
an increase of competition among producers and sellers there is some danger that competition may be
stifled by the growth of domestic and international
monopoly power as the private sector is encouraged to
increase production such power tends to restrict production with negative effects on aggregate supply if
anything competition should be increased keeping
437
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5

6

7

both prices and wages under control the problem is
identifying true monopoly power and developing viable programs to restrain it
an encouragement of the able bodied to leave welfare
and enter the labor market encouraging the able
bodied to work may require actual discouragement to
remaining on welfare it will certainly require great
ingenuity and a change in philosophy on the part of
the welfare workers and administrators as well as of the
law itself it will also require a major manpower effort
to assist those with little or no labor market skills to
become productive and participating workers the
frequent liberal argument is that there is little sense
developing market skills if there are no jobs if all you
give people is a hunting license to compete for nonexistent jobs this criticism becomes invalid if the rest of
the program to remove the fetters on producers is effective in stimulating production and employment
thus restraining inflation if there is criticism of the
reagan program it is for the reduction in manpower
programs directed toward this end 8
improvement of the efficiency of the operation of the
labor market improving the efficiency of labor will
reduce the length of unemployment of workers and
automatically increase production this too is an
area in which the reagan program in its budget
cutting zeal seems to have erred by cutting too deeply
into the budget of the employment service which is
one of the major aids in improving labor market efficiency
A decrease in government spending and the national
product ifwe
debt as a percent of our gross national
nationalproduct
if we
iffe
can reduce government spending and the national
debt the public sector competition for loan funds will
be reduced driving interest rates down the private
sector will take up the slack growing relative to the
public sector there would then be increased tax
revenues even in the face of reduced tax rates on savers
and investors these increased revenues can then

n late september 1982 the congress passed and the president signed the job training parthowever in
nership act to replace the often criticized CETA comprehensive employment training act program
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provide the means of reducing the rate of growth of
the federal deficit to less than the rate of growth of the
economy
this last objective will be difficult to achieve in the face of persistent international tensions requiring heavy defense related spending
A guaranteed international peace could make the goal feasible the
question is how to achieve peace and there is no easy answer to this
conundrum foes of defense spending usually assume such spending
to be a complete waste however it is not a complete loss when the
various weapons systems are built people are at least put to work and
receive income the economic negative is that defense industry workers produce goods which do not enter the consumer marketplace
while their incomes do stimulating consumer demand and prices
economically this effect is much the same as a concentration of spending on nonproductive human services
Reag anomic
these seven objectives are by and large those of reaganomic
practitioners reaganomics may not be the perfect answer but knowsingle minded
ing that past keynesian oriented public policy makers singleminded
emphasis on aggregate demand has not achieved its goals perhaps it
is time we give supply side economics the 0opportunity to prove i tself
to do so will require time some progress has been made with both
interest rates and inflation significantly lower than they have been for
years the inflationary expectations of the past decade already seem
to be weakening under the pressure of the deep recession we have
been experiencing labor unions have even been willing to negotiate
contracts with substantial wage concessions and reduction of limitations on production the index of industrial production appears to
be inclining upward and productivity output per man hour is increasing high cost inventories built up in anticipation of continued
inflation have been significantly reduced the october upsurge of
the stock market indicates renewed investor optimism making a signific ant reduction in the more intractable excessive unemployment
nificant
rate will unfortunately take longer but any renewed attempt to
reduce unemployment simply through artificially stimulating aggregate demand by way of fiscal or monetary policy will probably set up a
new wave of inflation delaying a return to a stable prosperous and
economic
just socio econ
ornic system
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